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ARRESTING TECHNOLOGY: AN ESSAY
ANN BARTOWt

I.
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF SHARING

Content owners analogize copying technology to burglar's tools,1
and acts of copyright infringement to theft and piracy. 2 The rhetoric
can be scorching. Metallica attorney Howard King equated Napster
with thievery as follows: "At this moment, all around the world, hundreds of thousands of people are breaking into record stores and stealing CDs and tapes. Or they might as well be."' 3 In their complaint filed
against Napster and several universities, plaintiffs Metallica and
Creeping Death Music accused Napster users of exhibiting "the moral
fiber of common looters."4 Metallica was willing to spew vitriol on
Napster users, but apparently not particularly concerned about holding them legally accountable for alleged acts of copyright infringement. 5 Instead, the machinery of the law was brought to bear on
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. Ideas in
this essay were presented at the Beyond Napster: Debating the Future of Copyright in the
Internet Symposium at American University, Washington School of Law (Nov. 16, 2000).
She thanks the members of the American University Law Review for hosting the Symposium and Professor Jessica Litman for her influential thinking on this topic. This essay is
dedicated to Jim McKenny and Casey Bartow-McKenny.
1 Metallica Sues Napster, Universities, Citing Copyright Infringement and RICO Violations (Apr. 13, 2000) (Searching for the band's tracks and downloading them on Napster
was like walking by a Tower Records or HMV music store, seeing that the cash register
was open and that no one was in the store, and helping yourself to whatever was available,
according to Gayle Fine of Q Prime, Metallica's management company) at http://
www.livedaily.com/news/781.html.
2 Metallica Sues Napster, Universities, Citing Copyright Infringement and RICO Violations, supra note 1. ("From a business standpoint [trading files via Napster], this is about
piracy-a.k.a. taking something that doesn't belong to you; and that is morally and legally
wrong. The trading of such information-whether it's music, videos, photos, or whateveris, in effect, trafficking in stolen goods," said Metallica drummer, Lars Ulrich.).
3 Two Views on the Copyright Dispute Between Metallica and Napster, CNN.Com Law
Center (May 19, 2000) http://www.cnn.com/LAW/columnsldual.metallica.05.19/ (last visited October 12, 2000).
4 Metallica Files Suit Against Napster, University of Southern California, Indiana University (Apr. 13, 2000) at http://www.metallica.com/news/2000/000413a.html; Metallica
Takes on Napster (Apr. 14, 2000) at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/
0,1151,14119,00.html (citing ZDNet's report about Metallica's press release).
5 See, e.g., Metallica News FAQ: "We are going after Napster, the main artery here.
All the people doing illegal things here, whether with good or bad intentions, we are not
going after individual fans. Metallica has always felt fans are family." At http://www.metallica.com/news/2000/napfaq.html (last visited October 12, 2000). But see RIAA Assists in
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Napster, in an attempt to arrest a technology that enables peer-topeer file sharing, while leaving the peers themselves free to purchase
compact disks and attend future concerts.
Almost half of the people who responded to a recent nationwide
survey said they do not have Internet access at home, and forty percent said they do not intend to get connected in the next four years.
Those who do not have Internet access were likely to be disproportionately older, poorer, and less educated than those who do, and
Caucasians were determined to be more likely to be connected to the
Internet than people of color. 6 For this reason, many of the stereotypical impressions one might hold about individuals who are likely to
steal (poor, uneducated members of minority races) are especially unsupportable in cyberspace. In fact, in this country much of the
"cyberthievery" and "cyberpiracy" (in the form of unauthorized copying of copyrighted works) is apparently committed by relatively affluent college students. 7 Perhaps this is one of the reasons that as a
society we seem to prefer outlawing copying technology to encouraging legal action against individual noncommercial copyright infringers.
One can only hope that another explanation for a reluctance to
take legal action against individual noncommercial copyright infringers is a cultural unwillingness directly and linearly to equate unauthorized not-for-profit copying with criminal behavior. When the vendors
of a copying technology are judicially labeled contributory infringers,
then the actual users of the technology have necessarily been deemed
guilty of copyright infringement as well, but most may be conceptually
unaware of this if they have not been parties to the legal proceedings.
Almost everyone has recorded copyrighted television broadcasts, photocopied copyrighted writings, or made duplicates of cassette tapes or
compact discs containing copyrighted songs. These actions don't seem
like theft at the level of abstraction on which most people operate.
(This is not for lack of effort on the part of content owners. 8 Professor
Student's Arrest (Sept. 18, 2000) (Where an Oklahoma State University student had his
personal computer and a CD recorder seized after university officials were notified by the
RIAA that he may have downloaded as many as 1,000 Internet music files. The unnamed
student had not been arrested, and there was no evidence that he had been selling the files
or profiting in any way from the downloads.) at http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,38863,00.html.
6 Consumer Groups Say 'DigitalDivide' Puts Millions in U.S. at a Disadvantage (Oct.
11, 2000) at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/l0/11/digital.divide/index.html.
7 Schools Recess on Napster (Aug. 30, 2000) at http://www.wired.com/news/print/

0,1294,38525,00.html ("Nearly 40 percent of Napster's 25 million users are college-aged,
and being able to deliver to that audience has been viewed as a major component of the
company's overall worth.").
8 The F.B.I., Justice Department, and Information Technology Association of
America, a trade group, are engaged in initiatives to educate children about "cyberethics,"
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Pamela Samuelson has noted efforts to "educate" school children
about the "crime" of nonprofit unauthorized copying. 9) Those who
use libraries on a regular basis may very well see free access to information as a societal good rather than a felonious transgression. 10
Downloading an unauthorized copy of a creative work does not
have quite the gestalt of grabbing an item from the bins of a retailer
and sprinting for the store exit, nor does it have the same consequences for a retailer. If someone steals a one-of-a-kind diamond ring
from a jewelry gallery, it is gone. If a person simply takes a photograph of the ring, takes the picture to another jeweler, and has a copy
made, the owner-originator still has the ring, which has lost only its
uniqueness. The jeweler who designed the ring has lost a sale, but has
not been deprived of precious stones or metals or imbedded labor and
resources. If the illicit photographer does no more than photograph
the ring, the jeweler has lost nothing except control over a two-dimensional image of her three-dimensional creation.
Copying a song without authorization doesn't prevent the composer from playing or licensing her music, or from selling "legitimate"
copies to interested consumers, so the song is clearly not "lost" in the
same way a ring would be if stolen. Yet a good-quality playable copy
performs the same function as the diamond ring itself. Alchemical devices that quickly and inexpensively duplicate fine jewelry exist only
in science fiction. Technology capable of making hundreds of nearperfect copies of digital works is increasingly diverse, plentiful, and
accessible. A song is hot a diamond ring, and copying is neither theft
nor looting in any traditional sense. Commercial bootlegging probably
seems wrong to most people, but photocopying a few chapters of a
book does not. Context is everything.
Because individual consumers' activities over digital networks
can be tracked and recorded, noncommercial personal copying activities that are essentially undetectable in the offline world become ascertainable and quantifiable when conducted online. The nature of
digital technology means that many activities analogous to non-infringing acts in the offline world become putatively technical infringements when conducted over the Internet, because some degree of
and apparently equate making unauthorized copies of MP3 files with hacking and other
cybercrimes. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, F.B.I. Calls For Cyber Ethics Education (last visited
Oct. 10, 2000) available at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/technology/AP-Ethics-inCyberspace.html.
9 Id.
10 See generally Ann Bartow, Libraries in a Digital and Aggressively Copyrighted
World: Retaining Patron Access Through Changing Technologies, OHIO STATE LAw JOURNAL

(forthcoming summer 2001).
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content copying is a functional requirement of using a computer.11
Traditionally, loaning or giving a book, compact disc, or videocassette
to a friend infringed no rights under copyright. The right to share or
dispose of a purchased copy of a copyrighted work fell within the firstsale doctrine.12 In cyberspace, however, one cannot share material
over the Internet without reproducing and transmitting it. It is therefore necessary as well as expedient to make multiple copies of copyrighted works, which enables (if one is so inclined) broad sharing with
many people simultaneously, on a scale not possible with a book, compact disc, or videocassette. However, to prevent widespread sharing,
content owners are attempting to use courts and laws to render it
technologically impossible for individuals to share even one "legitimate" copy of a work. Though the Internet makes sharing information
faster and easier than ever, some content owners would have all digital sharing unauthorized by them rendered illegal.
II.
KEEPING ONE'S EYES ON ONE'S OWN WORK

The last few decades have been marked by the development of
new technologies that facilitate copying, including modern
photocopiers, audio and video recorders, cable television, fax machines, communications satellites, and, of course, the computer.13 Like
other copying tools, the decentralized Internet has no inherent ability
to distinguish copyrighted materials from other varieties of content.
At a functional level the Internet treats all information identically,
whether it is political or cultural speech, copyrighted or not, and is
14
essentially unregulated.
Distributing content on the Internet can differ dramatically from
real-space distribution techniques. In the context of retail e-commerce, for example, a web page can simply function as a digital version of an ordinary catalog, at which one places an order, designates a
mode of shipping, and then waits patiently for Federal Express,
United Parcel Service, or the U.S. Post Office to deliver the product.
11 See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 109. In 1984, Congress enacted the Record Rental Amendment of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984) (codified as amended at 17 USCA §§ 109,
115).
13 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 447 (1984);
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Buck v. JewellLaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); Williams & Wilkins v. United States, 487 F.2d
1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
14 See, e.g., Zeran case discussion of importance of leaving Internet unregulated (quoting legislative history of 47 U.S.C. 230). Zeran v. America, 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir.
1997).
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This is the model used for e-tailing clothing, food, furniture-indeed,
all manner of tangible consumer goods. In other, more pertinent contexts, however, a web page can simultaneously function as catalog,
warehouse, and courier: software, music, video, two-dimensional art
and graphics, written text, and any other goods capable of digitalization. Using available technology, consumers can use sophisticated
search and preference matching engines to identify desirable content.
Where distribution, promotion, and support costs are low enough, a
large, diverse assortment of content providers can be expected to nurture their entrepreneurial spirits online. Low barriers to entry foster
competition, which poses threats to industries accustomed to oligarchic control of distribution, such as the music, movie, and publishing
industries, and foments both opportunity and uncertainty. Savvy, preexisting real-space distributors with good industry relationships and
quality products and services would intuitively be in the best positions
to utilize innovative new modes of content distribution in a profitable
manner. Conversely, large, ponderous entities that buttress their industry hegemony through distortive exploitation of power imbalances
rather than effective business practices are appropriately concerned
that increased competition can threaten their market dominance. The
ultimate impact of cyberspace on content distribution is manifestly unclear. One commentator, for example, articulated some of the questions surrounding the development of electronic publishing as follows:
The controversy over the [International eBook Award Foundation]
awards and the birth of its grass-roots alternative... highlight some
pressing issues for e-publishing-issues that have so far gotten lost
in either idealism about the freedom it may give authors and
independent publishers or eagerness on the part of the established
book industry to stake its claim in a new medium. Will e-books offer
a way for writers who've been snubbed by the big houses to find
success marketing their books directly to readers? Or will e-publishing simply present the same books and authors currently found in
bookstores, only in a different, less tangible form? Will mainstream
publishers' newfound interest in the e-publishing scene bring a
higher standard of literary quality and professionalism to a community that until now was amateur in the best and worst senses of the
word? Is a small bastion of independence being stamped out, or are
e-book readers finally going to get content they find truly
15
enticing?
Many content owners find themselves struggling to retool and
adapt to the new distribution methods enabled by the Internet, while
15 Kera Bolonik, The E-Book Wars, SALON (Oct. 20, 2000) at http://www.salon.com/
books/feature/2000/10/20/frankfurt/print.html.
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simultaneously devoting substantial resources to initiatives intended
to preserve and defend their prevailing modes of operation. To advance the goal of preservation of the status quo, content owners are
attempting to use the legal process to arrest the development of digital
copying technologies. 16 Not all of the entities vigorously litigating
against technology are moribund oligarchies: some content owners are
well suited to meeting the challenges of cyberspace and may be suing
in knee-jerk fashion, or as a bargaining tactic with which to bludgeon
(or at least obtain leverage over) putatively competing technologists
during licensing negotiations. Nevertheless, copyright law should not
bestow business interests with the right to interfere with or control
technology developed by others. Allowing copyrights to be used for
this purpose will chill the development of new technologies, which can
be just as useful and creative as other content. Those technologies not
dissuaded by the chilling effect of almost certain litigation will be underground and decentralized, formulated to evade copyright suits, and
very difficult to enjoin.
A.

Copyright Law Is Intended to Promote, Not Arrest,
Technological Development

Courts should respond cautiously to claims that new technologies
should be banned or heavily regulated simply because they facilitate
copyright infringement. The Constitution empowers Congress to enact
copyright laws in order to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts .... "17 Outlawing a useful technology merely because many
people use it as a tool for infringement would hinder rather than promote such progress.

18
In Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios

("Sony"), the Supreme, Court held that "the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial non-infringing uses."'19 The Court specifically stated that uses
to be considered included "the different potential uses" as well as acSee, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Recording Industry Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 624; the DeCSS discusion in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Scour, and of course Napster. Cf Kera Bolonik, The EBook Wars supra n.15, (Some publishers think Microsoft is using vehicles such as the International eBook Award Foundation to "make sure that whatever e-book revolution may lie
in the future will be owned by the world's largest software company.").
17 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
16

19 Id.
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tual, current ones. In the context of the technology in dispute, the
Betamax videocassette recorder, the threshold was met for two reasons: first, because consumers could use the Betamax to record programming that either was not copyrighted, or was copyrighted but
owned by entities that did not object to having it recorded for private,
noncommercial purposes; and second, because the unauthorized "time
shifting" that Betamax recordings enabled was a fair use of copyrighted works, regardless of whether or not copyright owners en20
dorsed the practice.
The Supreme Court declined to hold that Sony could market
VCRs only if it could ensure that the VCRs were never used to commit infringement, or paid licensing fees, or forced VCR owners to remit royalties to copyright owners. Sony stands squarely for the
proposition that copyright law does not give copyright owners control
over new technologies with legitimate uses, even though consumers
can use those technologies to enjoy copyrighted works without authorization. It is clear why copyright owners might want such dominion over the technological accomplishments of others, but the
copyright laws do not currently give it to them. The core copyright
principle recognized in the Sony opinion is that intellectual property
owners are not entitled to prohibit or exercise monopoly control over
new technologies that incidentally (or even not so incidentally)
threaten their established modes of commerce. Evolving technologies
create new opportunities for lawful competition and, as a result, copyright owners must sometimes change their business methods. While
most large-scale copyright owners recognize this, and are devoting resources to developing electronic distribution mechanisms, they are simultaneously using the legal process to delay or complicate the
deployment of potentially competitive technologies. While multifaceted responses by content owners to the challenges posed by the
Internet are both understandable and prudent, the courts should not
reconfigure copyright law to serve the interests of select businesses.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has forbidden this, holding in Sony: "[I]n
an action for contributory infringement against the seller of copying
equipment, the copyright holder may not prevail unless the relief that
he seeks affects only his programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all
'2 1
copyright holders with an interest in the outcome.
Copyright law is not intended or designed to insulate copyright
owners from the course of technological development. The development of peer-to-peer networking technologies may undermine estab20
21

Id. at 424.
Id. at 446-47.

102

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:95

lished models of content distribution and marketing. However, that is
a setback for which current copyright law provides no cure. Copyright
law should not be reconfigured (and distorted) to facilitate the wholesale suppression of new technologies.
Penalizing technology originators for the uses to which the technology is put has been largely a losing proposition when applied to,
say, weapons.22 Guns don't kill people, goes the hackneyed saying,
people kill people. Yet in the copyright context, copying technologies
are increasingly viewed as the outlaws, robbing copyright owners of
royalties and market share. The ostensibly bad behavior of technology
users is pilloried as a means to impugn the technology. The actual
copiers, those alleged to have directly infringed copyrights, are often
left unscathed, because they are also content purchasers, and generally copyright owners do not want to antagonize them. 23
Copyright law has never given copyright owners control over all
uses of their works. Rather, it gives copyright owners exclusive rights
and expressly subjects those rights to a host of exceptions. 24 The law
allows unauthorized copies, downloads, uploads, transmissions, or distributions that might be fair use under §107 of the Copyright Act; lawful audio noncommercial consumer copies under § 108; and private
performances and transmissions over which the statute gives the copyright owner no control. Sony makes plain that facilitation of such unauthorized but lawful uses is sufficient as a matter of law to constitute
the capability for substantial non-infringing use. 25 Copyright protections are intended to provide adequate incentives for investment in
22 See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright

Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L. J. 1833, 1860-62
(2000).
23 See, e.g., Metallica News FAQ: "We are going after Napster, the main artery here.
All the people doing illegal things here, whether with good or bad intentions, we are not
going after individual fans. Metallica has always felt fans are family," at http://
www.metallica.com/news/2000/napfaq.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2000). See also, Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright. Reclaiming the Right to Photocopy Freely, 60 U.
PlTr. L. REV. 149, 203 (Fall 1998).
24 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-122, 1008.

25 The Court wrote:
Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not necessarily infringing. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copyright
statute. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 154-155. Moreover, the definition of exclusive rights in § 106 of the present Act is prefaced
by the words "subject to sections 107 through 120." Those sections describe a

variety of uses of copyrighted material that "are not infringements of copyright" "notwithstanding the provisions of section 106." The most pertinent in
this case is § 107, the legislative endorsement of the doctrine of "fair use."
464 U.S. at 447.
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the development of future creative works, but by design, adequate incentives for such undertakings are far shy of the perfect-incentives
framework that content owners aspire to.
Only when a technology is not capable of legitimate uses does it
make sense to outlaw it. In the context of computer programs that
copy, transmit, display, or otherwise manipulate data in a copyrightneutral manner, it is difficult to conceive of software innovations that
could be so defined. Perhaps this is why content owners are so desperate to undermine the Supreme Court's holding in Sony.
Courts need to avoid constructing the doctrine of contributory
infringement in a manner that renders it impractical for informationsharing applications to operate under its strictures. The key feature of
peer-to-peer file sharing systems is that the individual users control
the transfer of files. Forcing technology producers to configure communication systems to ensure that users could not share files without
the copyright owner's authorization would require preventing users
from controlling the selection and transfer of files, lest they choose to
engage in unauthorized transfers. The effect would be to legally disable enormously promising technological innovations. 26 Copyright
owners' interests in maintaining control over their works are very important, but not so important that society should forgo technology capable of substantial non-infringing uses in order to protect those
interests. One recent example of large content owners attempting to
control three related technologies simultaneously is the burgeoning
litigation activities of the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA). The RIAA first brought suit against Diamond Multimedia
Systems' Rio MP3 player,27 in conjunction with other litigation strategies it is pursuing. This device plays sound files that are downloaded
from the Internet to a PC in MP3 format, 28 which compresses and
stores near-CD-quality music. 29 The Rio can download any MP3 file,
whether the owner paid for the download or made an unauthorized
copy. 30 In trying to block (or at least control) the sale of Rios, large
26 See, e.g., Hummer's Napster Bummer (Oct. 12, 2000), at http://www.economist.com/
editorial/freeforall/current/indexwb0340.html.
27 See Recording Industry Assoc. of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F.3d
1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
28 Rival formats are offered by companies such as Liquid Audio and a2bmusic, a subsidiary of AT&T, which offer proprietary platforms for online music distribution. IBM also
has a digital distribution platform in production. See Jennifer Sullivan, Industry to Take on
MP3, WIRED NEWS (Dec. 12, 1998), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,16794,00.
html.
29 See, e.g., Chris Stamper, Diamond Countersues, Defends Rio, posted to WIRED
NEWS (Dec. 12, 1998) at http://www.wired.com/news/print/9,1294,16586,00.html.
30 Id.
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content owners attempted the first prong of a litigation hat trick: using
copyright suits to take out or co-opt a device for playing songs in the
MP3 format (regardless of how they were obtained), the MP3 format
itself, and, finally, technologies for using or sharing files in the format
(such as Napster, Scour, and MyMP3). This is but one example of the
use of both successive and simultaneous copyright suits brought to impede the dissemination of creative works by attacking distributive
technology that is not controlled by large mainstream content owners.
Sometimes just the threat of litigation can be enough to delay or
repress content distribution. A carefully orchestrated campaign of
conflicting information (and resulting uncertainty and fear) can close
otherwise promising channels of content delivery. For example, many
webcasters seeking to legally broadcast music online express frustration that the processes of obtaining the appropriate licenses and permission are complicated, expensive, and fraught with uncertainties. It
is apparently the onerous licensing process, rather than technological
difficulties, that is impairing the development of viable webcasting
businesses. 31
Perhaps technologists could write software that would inventory
users' hard drives when they log on and allow only the authorized
sharing of pre-approved content. However, this burdens the suppliers
of a technology with presumptive liability for infringements committed by the technology's users if they fail to design or retrofit technologies that can be used to share content to minimize the possibility of
infringement. The Court in Sony did not hold that, when ordinary
people use a new technology to engage in copyright infringement, the
supplier of that technology must come up with ways to stop the infringement or stand enjoined. Rather, the Court held the opposite:
notwithstanding the fact that a technological tool can facilitate copyright infringement, the "Progress of Science and the useful Arts" precludes an injunction so long as the tool is capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Copyright law falls on the side of permitting and promoting new technology, not of stifling it. Content owners purport to
be figuratively asking the police to arrest thieves. In fact, what they
are sometimes asking is that previously legal behavior be redefined as
criminal, so that vendors are relieved of the burden of sorting out
shoplifters from suspicious-seeming but innocent browsers and legitimate purchasers. If anyone is obligated to investigate, monitor, and
control what end users are doing, it ought to be the content owners,

31 See, e.g., Christopher Jones, Webcasters in License Limbo, WIRED NEWS (March 27,
2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,34115,00.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2000).
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who can verify or disprove their suspicions, and then proceed
accordingly.
B.

Technology Itself Will Resist Arrest

Decentralized models of information dispersal such as peer-topeer networking pose a significant challenge to sectors of the entertainment and information businesses that follow a model of centralized control over content distribution. 32 However, this is not the sort
of challenge that copyright law is designed to redress. The Internet is
open and decentralized by design. This enables a diverse range of new
technologies to be adapted to the existing protocol base. Many of
these technologies enable editing, extraction, or transmission of content, most of which both require and facilitate some degree of content

copying. Even technologies that enable copying as an end goal generally have coterminous beneficial non-infringing uses. For example,
peer-to-peer network technologies may have the potential to replace
33
inefficient search engines (thereby increasing content accessibility),
and to reduce network congestion. 34 They may be harnessed to help
32 See, e.g., Associated Press, Napster, Bertelsmann Deal Questioned (Nov. 1, 2000)
(Computer engineer quoted for proposition that "a peer-to-peer environment, just by design, is not secure") available at SALON, http://www.salon.com/tech/wire/2000/11/01/napster/print.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2000).
33 Peer-to-peer file sharing may hold solutions for a number of problems plaguing the
Internet. The majority of individuals search for content on the Internet using search engines. See Steve Lawrence & Lee Giles, Accessibility and Distributionof Information on
the Web, 400 NATURE 107 (1999). Current search engines, however, are imperfect, indexing
only a small fraction of available websites. The design of web-based search engines, moreover, tends to favor commercial sites over non-commercial ones, popular sites over more
marginal ones, and U.S.-based sites over sites in other countries. See id., Helen Nissenbaum and Lucas Introna, Sustaining the Public Good Vision of the Internet: The Politics of
Search Engines (Princeton University Center for the Arts and Cultural Policy Studies
Working Paper #9, 1999). Current search engines have a massive task to complete in order
to maintain a current record of even a small fraction of the Internet, and their indexes are
notoriously out of date. See Lawrence & Giles, supra. Peer-to-peer networking enables
individuals to locate material available over the Internet that most search engines do not
find, by searching among computers of groups of individuals likely to have the content or
know where to find it.
Peer-to-peer file sharing systems have significant advantages over conventional webbased distribution for individuals who want to make content available as well as for those
who seek content. Distribution over a peer-to-peer network does not require access to a
web server, nor the ability to translate the content into HTML code. Further, it is unnecessary to cause the content to be indexed by a search engine, or to encourage the search
engine to list it prominently in relevant search results. Peer-to-peer file sharing systems
have the potential to change the architecture of the Internet. See, e.g., Amy Kover, Napster: The Hot Idea of the Year, FORTUNE, June 26, 2000, at 128.
34 Peer-to-peer technology, finally, holds promise as a potential method to relieve network congestion. Because file transfers need not be routed through central control points
(and need not even be hosted at central locations), the ability to share files using peer-topeer technology does not depend on the level of traffic at a host server. Thus, the technol-
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members of the academic, scientific, or medical communities expeditiously share specialized information.
In any event, it is not clear that as a practical matter any technology could ensure that only non-infringing file sharing took place,

while continuing to offer a peer-to-peer network system, since peerto-peer file sharing systems vest control over the transfer of files in
individual users. From the users' point of view, that is their most compelling feature. If the proprietors of peer-to-peer file sharing systems
are required to control the content of all files on the system, the technology will lose much of its value for a host of legitimate informationsharing applications. 35 Moreover, attempting to stop the deployment
of emerging decentralized sharing technologies could entail shutting
down a substantial portion of the Internet, 36 which is an option that in

ogy ultimately may deliver greatly increased efficiency in the operation of the Internet. See,
e.g., Amicus Copyright Law Professors, Napster, 239 F.3d 1010.
35 Napster facilitates file transfers by maintaining information location tools on central
Napster servers, and supplying Internet Protocol address and routing information to users
seeking to transfer files. More recent peer-to-peer file sharing systems, such as Gnutella,
dispense with central servers entirely. Because the district court cast its "continuing control" exception as one of several alternative grounds for declining to apply Sony, the absence of central servers would not exempt any peer-to-peer network system from the
court's analysis. The breadth of the injunction, moreover, would prohibit decentralized file
sharing systems as well as systems designed on the same model as Napster.
36 See, e.g., Larry Lessig, Napster affidavit paragraph 66: "Gnutella is a simple substitute for Napster. It facilitates a better peer-to-peer searching capability and is operated in a
far more decentralized manner. Because of this architecture, there would be no way, under
the present architecture of the net, for a court to stop the deployment of Gnutella without
essentially shutting down a substantial portion of the Internet. Gnutella is simply an application that runs on the net; there is no central server for this application; links are made in
a chain that itself is not consistent or easily tracked." Lessig affidavit at http://
dl.napster.com/lessig.pdf. But see Janelle Brown, The Gnutella Paradox, SALON (Sept. 9,
2000), at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/09/29/gnutella-paradox/print.html ("Consider this: File sharing systems work best when they reach critical mass - only once they
have a significant number of users is it likely that someone out there will have the file you
want. That's why Napster has continued to grow; with 30 million users the odds are in your
favor that one or two of them will have what you need. But as soon as a file-sharing system
has critical mass, it's big enough and threatening enough to become the copyright protectorate's next legal target; and those file-trading masses are also going to strain the network
to its capacity and beyond. That's the Gnutella paradox. The attainment of widespread
popularity may in fact signal a file trading software program's imminent demise.").
Other possible substitutes for Napster include Hotline, iMesh and Scour. See, e.g.,
Chad Kempfert, "Metallica Sues Napster, Fans Left Dumbstruck at MillionaireMove, ALTERNATIVE MUSIC (April 4, 2000) at http://altmusic.about.com/musicperform/altmusic/library/weekly/aa041400a.htm. (last visited Oct 12, 2000). Still others include AIM and ICQ.
See Jon Katz, Metallica's 'Justice' And Napster, SLASHDOT (April 28, 2000), at http://
slashdot.org/features/00/04/16/2139241.shtml (last visited Oct. 12, 2000). Mojo Nation is another alternative. See, e.g., Damien Cave, The Mojo Solution, SALON (Oct 9, 2000) at
http://www.salon.com/tech/view/2000/10/09/mojo_nation/print.html.
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the past courts have viewed with disfavor. 3 7 Given that all works that
can be categorized as copyrightable subject matter are automatically
copyrighted upon fixation in a tangible medium of expression, unauthorized sharing of copyrighted content is inevitable whenever there is
informational sharing. Those who desire large-scale sharing will inevitably pursue more decentralized sharing mechanisms that will be
harder for courts to reach or control. 38 Ultimately, individuals determined to make illicit copies will probably succeed, while all Internet
users, copiers and non-copiers alike, may bear the burdens of technological restrictions and legal strictures inhibiting innovation and the
exploitation of digital resources.
There is nothing inherently evil about peer-to-peer file sharing,
nor anything inherently detrimental to authors, composers, or artists.
Technology is copyright neutral until users of the technology act. Inexpensive techniques for promoting and distributing works could promote creation of large numbers of diverse works. Such technologies
could actually result in the originators of creative works capturing a
greater portion of the income streams that their efforts generate, especially where digital technologies significantly reduce production and
transaction costs.
The absence of such technologies could certainly negatively impact authors and artists. As one industry observer stated: "[I]f you're a
journalist, writing wouldn't do much good if printing presses were outlawed. ' '39 Even Metallica could suffer: in its early days the band encouraged fans to tape concerts and share those tapes with others to
help build an audience base. 40 Even now, the band allows noncommercial "bootlegging" and permits bootlegged MP3 files to be traded
via Napster. 41 However, any assumption that content owners (as contrasted with content creators) consistently want to disseminate works
as broadly as possible, in congruence with the societal goals of copyright, is sadly misguided. The value and price of copyrighted works,
37 See, e.g., Religious Technology Center v. Netcom Online Communications Services,
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("The court does not find workable a theory
of infringement that would hold the entire Internet liable for activities that cannot reasonably be deterred."). See also Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).
38 See, e.g., Larry Lessig, supra note 36.
39 Diamond Vice President Ken Wirt, quoted by Chris Stamper in Diamond Countersues, Defends Rio, WIRED NEWS (Dec. 12, 1998), available at http://www.wired.com/news/
print/0,1294,16586,00.html.
40 See, e.g., Jonathan Yardley, The Napster Generation, WASHINGTON POST (May 8,
2000), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/2000-05/08/0461-050800-

idx.html.
41 See, e.g., Metallica News FAQ: "We are not going after Napster for anything that
relates to Metallica bootlegs .... at http://www.metallica.com/news/2000/napfaq.html (last
visited Oct 12, 2000).
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like any other commercial goods, can be manipulated by careful control of supply and demand. For example, the rock musician Prince was
limited by Warner Brothers Records, Inc., to producing one record
every eighteen months, even though he wanted to release a record
every seven months, 42 presumably because such limitations made his
music more unique and valuable. The company also refused to release
a three-CD set that Prince wanted to craft and distribute. 43 These may
have been prudent business decisions with respect to Warner Brothers' profits, but they did not further the copyright goals of creation
and dissemination of artistic works. It is not unreasonable to believe

that many talented artists and authors go unsigned, and that many
meritorious works go undistributed, when content-owner distributors
decide to focus exclusively on particular authors or genres for commercial reasons. Content creators who are excluded or ignored by
large content distributors are rarely concerned that Metallica, or Dr.
Dre, or Paul McCartney, or Elton John 44 gets every million possible.

By one report, 25,000 unknown but potentially very talented artists

45
expressly authorized Napster to permit its users to share their music

well before Napster struck a deal with Bertelsmann, owner of the
large BMG record label. 46 These 25,000 artists will not be able to take
advantage of peer-to-peer technologies if copyright litigation shuts
47
them down.

Realistically, significant monetary enrichment and empowerment
of authors and artists are not particularly likely outcomes of new
42 Reuters, 'The Artist' Dodges Label Clauses (November 9, 1999), available at WALL
OF SOUND, http://wallofsound.go.com/archive/news/stories/theartistll0999.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2000).
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Ryan Tate, Paul McCartney can't let Napsterbe, UPSIDE TODAY (November
27, 2000), available at http://www.upside.com/texis/mvm (reporting on Paul McCartney and
Elton John joining in supporting a weeklong campaign to advise people when they can
download free music).
45 See John Helleman, David Boies: The Wired Interview, WIRED (Oct 10, 2000), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.10/boies-pr.html (last visited Oct 10, 2000).
46 E.g., Eric Boehlert, In Defense of (Napster) Collusion, SALON (Nov. 2, 2000), at
http://www.salon.com/business/feature/2000/11/02/collusion/print.html.
47 When asked whether Napster and similar technologies were good for artists, musician John Hiatt replied: "Absolutely. How could it not be? How could another avenue of
being able to get yourself heard not be a good thing? The traditional avenues have gotten
so corporatized - it's going to be one big major label when they're all done eating each
other. And then there's one or two conglomerates that own all the radio stations, so you
have to sound a certain way to make that work. When things get so constricted like that,
other arteries have to open up. And that's what's happening, I think. The industry's needing a triple bypass. [Laughs] And the Web's giving it to 'em." Amy Reiter, A Conversation
with John Hiatt, SALON (Sept 25, 2000), at http://www.salon.com/people/feature/2000/09/
25/hiatt/print.html.
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technologies. 48 Even a cursory review of history seems to suggest that
creative people have been routinely under-compensated, under-appreciated, and generally ripped off well before the dawn of the Internet age. Still, it is at least a possibility. 49 One musician has
expressed great excitement about the prospect of releasing an album
in a pay-per-download format, enthusing:
It's a new way to get your music out. And it's a way of doing it
without a middleman, i.e., a big corporate record company. I call
the Internet "Willy Loman's revenge," from Death of a Salesman.

Willy Loman actually 50
gets to bring his wares right to the customer,
direct. That's exciting.
The forces that shape the effects that any given technology has
upon content creators, who usually do not retain ownership or control
of their creations, are driven much more directly by market considerations and business practices than by the technological landscape. One
reason artists and authors may not benefit from the exposure the Internet makes possible is that large-scale content owners will find a way
51
to control content distribution in cyberspace as they do in real space.
The ability to use copyright-based lawsuits to incapacitate emerging
distributive technologies would certainly help content owners reach
that goal. In the context of music, for example, this might mean that
musicians and composers begin to receive royalties from copyrightregulated uses of technologies such as Napster, which would monetarily benefit some artists to some degree. However, artists will simultaneously lose the ability to avail themselves of industry co-opted
technologies to promote and distribute music themselves or in conjunction with small companies. This will disadvantage what is probably the vast majority of artists-those who are not wealthy and are not
represented, managed, or otherwise in a business relationship with a
well-resourced content owner.
48 E.g., M.J. Rose, A Bad Ending for E-Authors, WIRED NEWS (Nov. 20, 2000) at http:/
/www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,40086,00.html. (Half of 5,000 self-published authors
with works for sale at MightyWords had their royalties reduced by 30 to 70%, and the
other half had their contracts terminated.)
49 E.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Struggles Over E-Books Abound, N. Y. TIMES (Nov 27,
2000) (in the Technology section). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/27/technology/27BOOK.html (uncertainty as to effect of emergence of "e-books" on authors, but
share of profits/royalties may increase).
50 John Hiatt, quoted in Amy Reiter, A Conversation with John Hiatt, SALON (Sept 25,
2000), at http://www.salon.com/people/feature/2000/09/25/hiatt/print.html.
51 The RIAA, for example, is preventing many webcasters it signs deals with from making public the royalty fees they have negotiated, which makes it hard for musicians to
figure out whether they are getting paid for the use of their music. See Brad King, Webcasters Caught in RIAA Web, Wired (Sept 27, 2000), available at http://www.wired.com/news/
print/0,1294,39076,00.html.
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All artists are disadvantaged when modes of distribution are precluded. Both broad access to the works of others and broad access by
others to their own works can increase exposure and creativity and
enhance the reputation of content creators. The ability to share in
cyberspace gives artists and authors access to each other's works, and
also may enable broader access to older pre-existing works. Ancient
films, documents, photographs, and sound recordings fixed in analog
media can, if digitalized, be preserved and disseminated in a manner
that greatly surpasses the level of availability in real space, often (at
least in sufficiently aged works) without implicating copyrights. Older,
out-of-circulation works that are still copyrighted raise more interesting questions. On one hand, digitalization may be the only venue
through which the copyright owners can hope to capitalize on warehoused works whose small audiences or discreet markets do not justify update and re-release through ordinary distribution channels. At
least one court decided that photocopy royalties were most important
with respect to out-of-print books, because such royalties were the
only way publishers could extract revenue from the works. 52 On the
other hand, if content owners are not willing to invest in maintaining
and distributing works themselves, is it really fair to give them control
(including veto power) over technologies that disseminate works with
minimal transaction costs, at the expense of enhanced preservation
and access? To do so would seem to violate the very precepts of copyright, as well as to facilitate an unearned windfall.
Meanwhile, if artists and authors are the true objects of concern,
there are better ways to ensure that artists are adequately compensated than banning technological innovations. Most pertinently, Congress could statutorily set a royalty floor for copyright authors, states
could follow and expand upon California's lead and guarantee artists
some percentage of the resale proceeds from their works,5 3 and content owners could be regulated in the way they are permitted to promote or restrict content creation and dissemination. Additionally, the
government could increase direct support for artists through vehicles
like the National Endowment for the Arts, and private organizations
could be encouraged to increase their support of the arts through tax
breaks and incentives, so that independent artists can remain that way
52 See Kinko's v. Basic Books' analysis that unauthorized copying damages out of print
books more than current/available ones because copy royalties are sometimes the only
income stream available to authors and publishers of out of print works, 758 F. Supp. at
1533. See also Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to
Photocopy Freely, 60 U. Pivr. L. REV. 149 (1998).
53 CAL. CIVIL § 986 (West 2001).
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without starving, and simultaneously retain ownership of copyrights in
their works.
Rather than attacking cyberspace-based modes of distribution,
copyright owners could invest their time and energy in protecting
their works with technology, leaving others to ignore, adopt, or thwart
(on an individualized scale, using technology rather than law) the new
modes of distribution. Though the Internet certainly presents a threat
to copyrighted materials, other technologies can radically improve the
ability of copyright holders to control the use and distribution of copyrighted works in cyberspace. 54 Some technologies make it more difficult for content to be "ripped" from authorized sources. Others make
it easier to track or spot illegal copying. 55 These technologies could be
adopted by content owners to identify and take action against those
who are actually engaging in detrimental acts of copyright infringement. Rather than asking web-based technologies and services to invade and monitor usage, content owners could more narrowly focus
requests for action with respect to specific incidents of copyright infringement. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 56 contains a notification procedure through which content owners can request that peerto-peer service providers suspend users suspected of copyright infringement. The user is notified and terminated unless she contests the
allegations, in which case the dispute may go to the courts for
adjudication.
This approach would reward content owners that take responsibility for controlling distribution of their intellectual property, while
simultaneously allowing new sharing technologies to flourish and to
be exploited freely by those who wish to utilize them. It facilitates the
targeting of bad actors, rather than the broad disablement of copyright-neutral technologies. It is the method of intellectual property policing encouraged by universities and other institutions concerned
about free speech and academic freedom.5 7
Most content owners are in fact pursuing "copyright control"
technologies, and they have successfully petitioned Congress for the
right to punish those who circumvent the technological protections
54 See, e.g., Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible:How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137
(1997).
55 E.g., the technology being developed pursuant to the Secure Digital Music Initiative
(SDMI). See Janelle Brown, SDMI: We're Not Hacked Yet, SALON (Nov. 8, 2000) at http://
www.salon.com/tech/log/2000/11/08/sdmitests/print.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2000).
56 P.L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. section 101, 512).
57 See, e.g., Andrea L. Foster, As Lawyer's DeadlineNears, Universities Say They Won't
Block Access to Napster, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, INFORMATION (Sept 22,
2000) (Technology section).
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they adopt. 58 This makes their attempts to legally disable competing
technologies especially ironic, if not flagrantly hypocritical. If content
owners devoted more resources toward improving "legitimate" online
distribution, the risks and challenges posed by unauthorized distributive mechanisms would be reduced.
If entities can use technology to protect content, and then use the
law to protect even substandard technology, why do content owners
bother suing the technologists? One sees a certain method in their
seemingly mad disregard of the high costs associated with litigation.
Criminalization of circumvention technology is helpful to content
owners at many levels. It protects entities with inadequate technological protections and relieves them of the burden of investing in upgrades. 59 What it doesn't do is give customers the inexpensive and
efficient content delivery they may demand. Content providers can
respond to consumer demand by developing their own distribution
technologies, or they can license those of others. The threat of copyright infringement liability is probably a good tool with which to leverage a license of new technology with copying capabilities on favorable
60
terms, and it appears to be ever more widely used.
Additionally, it would be useful to large-scale content owners to
have all content providers beholden to the same sorts of distribution
regimens. In real space, by and large, it seems to cost the same
amount of money to rent or otherwise access a movie, regardless of
which studio produced the movie, and regardless of how much the
movie cost to make and promote. "New releases" tend either to cost
more or to be available for shorter rental periods, but all of the new
releases cost about the same to obtain. Variations in price seem more
closely related to release date than to the popularity or quality of a
work. Prices for books and compact discs vary a bit more, but still do
not seem to vary greatly. 61 Nor does price seem to have any clear
relationship to either the creative or the capital investment in a work.
58 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, P.L. 105-304, 1122 Stat. 2860 (Oct, 28, 1998).
Meanwhile, a Congress that is too afraid of tampering with the Internet to tax Internet
sales or implement substantive consumer privacy protections, see supra note 15, did not
hesitate to impose copyright strictures, in the context of the DMCA.
59 For example, the recording industry has apparently not been able to deploy a workable pay-for-play scheme based on encrypting music with digital keys, see e.g., Associated
Press, Napster, Bertelsmann Deal Questioned (Nov. 1, 2000), available at http://www.salon.
com/tech/wire/2000/1l/01/napster/print.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2000), but may solve this
problem by appropriating the technology of others, such as Napster and Scour, and perhaps adopting a subscription model.
60 See cases cited infra (as shown by the recent flurry of litigation around Napster,
MP3, Scour, and DeCSS).
61 With respect to CDs at least, this is no coincidence, according to the Federal Trade
Commission's press release, Record Companies Settle FTC Chargesof RestrainingCompe-
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If single entities own or control both creative products and retail sales
channels, consumers may be at their mercy with respect to both access
and pricing. The best way for content owners to turn the pirating
masses into paying customers is to develop their own large-scale, pervasive, easy-to-use digital distribution system, and many are pursuing
this goal. However, they know that they will not succeed if their services are too difficult or too expensive, unless they can eliminate the
competition both through copyright litigation and aggressive business
practices.

Though Metallica's analogy of file sharing to theft is flawed, consider its implications. Few people would be willing to submit to invasive body searches as a condition for entering and leaving a retail
establishment, especially if one particular store was the only one that
posed such a requirement. However, if a large entity, or several large
entities desiring to perform such searches, were enterprising enough
to get a law passed requiring all retail venues in a given political subdivision to perform such searches, these entities would lose the competitive disadvantages and associated ill will they would doubtlessly have

incurred if they had promulgated such requirements unilaterally. All
tition in CD Music Market-All Five Major DistributorsAgree to Abandon Advertising
PricingPolicies (May 10, 2000), available at, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/cdpres.htm:
Universal Music and Video Distribution, Sony Corp. of America, Time-Warner
Inc., EMI Music Distribution and Bertelsmann Music Group (BMG), the five
largest distributors of recorded music who sell approximately 85 percent of all
compact discs (CDs) purchased in the United States [engaged in] allegedly illegal advertising policies that affected prices for CDs .... [A]II five companies
illegally modified their existing cooperative advertising programs to induce retailers into charging consumers higher prices for CDs, allowing the distributors
to raise their own prices. The FTC estimates that U.S. consumers may have
paid as much as $480 million more than they should have for CDs and other
music because of these policies over the last three years. According to the
FTC's complaints, the companies required retailers to advertise CDs at or
above the MAP set by the distribution company in exchange for substantial
cooperative advertising payments. The restrictions applied to all advertising,
including television, radio, newspaper and signs and banners within the retailers' own stores. The restrictions even applied to advertising funded entirely by
the retailer. Under the policies, large music retailers would lose millions of
dollars a year if they failed to follow the MAP restrictions. The complaints
detail how MAP policies were adopted to squelch discount music retailing. In
the early 1990s, many new music retailers, including major consumer electronics stores, started to sell CDs at low prices to gain customers and market share.
The more traditional music retailers also lowered their prices to compete. This
retail "price war" led to lower CD prices for U.S. consumers as prices for popular CDs fell as low as $9.99. The record companies adopted the MAP policies
in 1995-96 to extinguish this "price war," the Commission contends. The FTC
alleges these MAP policies achieved their unlawful objective. The "price war"
ended shortly after the policies were adopted and the retail price of CDs increased. The distributors then increased their own prices, and since 1997,
wholesale prices for music have increased.
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retail establishments would probably experience less shoplifting, but
low-margin retailers, forced to expend resources on searches they otherwise might prefer not to perform, would be required to absorb these
expenditures or to pass them along to consumers by raising prices.
In the realm of cyberspace, a copyright paradigm friendly to
large-scale content owners provides them with "plausible deniability"
Teflon shields if there are negative reactions to efforts to regulate and
curtail the manner in which consumers use (or are forbidden to use)
copyrighted content. Complaints about use restrictions can be met by
content owners with assertions that "it's not us, it's the law" that is
inflicting them. Eliminating independent sharing technologies reduces
the likelihood that entities will compete for customers based on the
"shareability" or "copyability" of content, to the extent that would
even occur with respect to creative works. Giving content owners the
ability to dodge responsibility for constricting consumer access to information is not an appropriate function of copyright doctrine, but
that is how it can be exploited.
C. Show Us the Money
In 1998, Jack Valenti, President & C.E.O. of the Motion Picture
Association of America, Inc., gave testimony to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee which included assertions that "the core copyright industries ... contributed an estimated $278.4 billion to the U.S.

economy" in 1996, and "gathered foreign sales and exports of $60.18
billion." '62 These staggering figures were intended to demonstrate the
magnitude of losses possible in the event of unfettered, wide-scale
copyright infringement. However, they also illustrate the tremendous
revenues reaped by content owners despite the copyright infringement
possibilities offered by the Internet. In fact, there is some evidence
that the ability to share and sample copyrighted works over the Internet ultimately increases "authorized" real-space sales of copies of
63
copyrighted works.
Attorney Howard King, who filed a lawsuit against Napster on
behalf of Metallica, stated that when music is copied without compensating the artists, software tools such as Napster "are allowing people
to rob creative artists of the fruit of their creations. The eventual re62 See Jack Valenti, Protecting America's Grandest Trade Prize, Comments by Jack Valenti, President & Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.,
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and the Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act (September 10, 1998), available
at http://www.mpaa.org/jack/98/98-9 10b.htm.
63 See, e.g., Brad King, Napster's Good? Bad? Er, What... ? WIRED NEWS (June 15,
2000) at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,37018,00.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2000).
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suit is there's no reason to be an artist, because you have to give away
your work for free."' 64 According to King, "Thousands of artists depend on record royalties to survive, to support their families and to
create more new music. Napster takes royalties from these artists....
Left unchecked, Napster threatens the livelihood of every writer and
musician. And except for the most established artists, Napster will
also eliminate the funding from record labels needed to pay the significant costs of making and marketing new records. '65 King's statements are clearly designed to evoke sympathy for musicians, but they
rely on several unsupported (and potentially unsupportable) assumptions. One is that thousands of artists actually receive royalties adequate to survive, support their families, and create new music. Yet one
record producer has suggested that an album that sells 250,000 copies
and grosses over $1.6 million at the wholesale level (and almost twice
that after retailing) will net band members as little as $4,000 each. 66 It
needs to be established through empirical research that nonprofit use
of digital copying and sharing technologies actually and appreciably
affects the royalties of authors and artists before this argument is accorded much weight.
King also seems to assume that, in the long run, file sharing technologies wouldn't suffer as much as record companies if copyright infringement stopped artists and authors from practicing their crafts.
Yet any business plan a new technology adopts will depend in some
way upon the constant creation of new, desirable content. No one will
utilize a file sharing mechanism if there are no interesting files to sample and share. Anyone hoping to profit long term from sharing technologies will be as motivated as the copyright industrial complex to
ensure the continued development of plentiful, high-quality creative
works.
One copyright industry insider has asserted that "foreign piracy
of U.S. copyrighted works" results in "estimated annual losses worldwide" of "approximately $18-$20 billion. '67 Since the individual was
64 Metallica Sues Napster, Universities, Citing Copyright Infringement and RICO Viola-

tions, posted 4/13/2000 to LIVE DAILY (April 13, 2000) at http://www.livedailey.com/news/
781.html, (last visited Oct. 12, 2000). See infra nn. 67-68.
65 Howard King, quoted in Two Views on the Copyright Dispute Between Metallica and

Napster, posted 5/19/2000 to CNN.Com Law Center (May 19, 2000), at http://www.cnn.
com/LAW/columns/dual.metallica.05.19/ (last visited Oct 12, 2000).
66 See Steve Albini, The Problem with Music, at http://www.negativland.com/albini.
html.
67 See Jack Valenti, WIPO One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media. Statements of Jack Valenti before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection Committee on
Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (October 28, 1999), available at http://
www.mpaa.org/jack/99/99 10_28b.htm.
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testifying before Congress, one would assume that there is a solid basis to these figures, and yet, while the loss figure is stunning, the hedge
words accompanying it ("estimated," "approximately") are equally
compelling. Naturally, any attempt to quantify foreign acts of copyright infringement would be an estimate. Yet offering dramatic figures
without support smacks of partisan demagoguery. It also raises questions about whether the actions of U.S. courts, which generally do not
have extraterritorial effect, can have much impact on large-scale
piracy. Eliminating non-profit sharing may even render it more profitable by increasing demand for pirated products.
Copyright owners who can demonstrate intentions to venture
into online distribution are increasingly allowed to demonstrate the
magnitude of wrongful takings with inchoate profits. They ought to be
required to support their allegations better by offering empirical evidence and realistic projections rather than bombastic, apocalyptic scenarios. The state can't convict someone of burglary because the
person "may have" stolen a large amount of money, and arresting
technology should also require proof of damages. Yet Universal Music
Group did not demonstrate any lost sales caused by the My.MP3.com
service when it prevailed in a copyright infringement suit, 68 and there
is no evidence that Napster has depressed CD sales. 69 Admittedly, affidavits offered by (for example) Napster users asserting that they
would not have purchased music they downloaded via Napster even in
the absence of the sharing technology seem contrived and a bit too
convenient. And yet, to this author they have the ring of truth. At
different periods in our life, my spouse and I have intentionally dispensed with television. Inevitably, however, we begin to feel culturally
disengaged, and eventually some life event that compels long periods
of prolonged inactivity (broken leg, new baby, etc.) induces us to
68 Amy Harmon, Enlisting Congress on Technology, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2000) (Technology Section) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/02/technology/02NECO.html
(last visited Oct 3, 2000).
69 See, e.g., Metallica Sues Napster, Universities, Citing Copyright Infringement and
RICO Violations, posted 4/13/2000 to LIVE DAILY (April 13, 2000), at http://

www.livedailey.com/news/781.html (last visited Oct 12, 2000) ("Entertainment attorney
Whitney Broussard pointed out that he hasn't seen CD sales fall since the advent of Napster, and no one in the business has put any hard numbers out to estimate the real losses.");
Napster attorney Laurence Pulgram, quoted in Two Views on the Copyright Dispute Between Metallica and Napster, CNN.CoM LAW CENTER (May 19, 2000), at http://

www.cnn.com/LAW/columns/dual.metallica.05.19/ (last visited Oct 12, 2000) ("[N]o one
has produced a speck of evidence that Napster has cost artists a dime. In fact, CD sales
were up substantially for 1999 and the first quarter of 2000 - even as Napster and other
file-sharing technologies were proliferating."); Eric Bohlert, Is Napster Hurting Record
Sales? SALON (Nov 27, 2000) at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/11/27/music-sales/
print.html (CD sales related to number and quality of new releases rather than Napster).
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reconnect our cable. Predictably, we spend most of the next seventytwo hours glued to the screen, watching even the most vapid programming late into the night. Then, sated, we grow choosier about the
shows we deem worthy of our time. Gradually our interest and attention dwindle, and eventually days and sometimes weeks pass in which
we don't even turn the television on. A cable bill arrives during a
televisionless interval, and we debate once again dispensing with television altogether. I mention these biographical trivia because I suspect Napster users follow a similar cycle. The siren song of free music
causes short-term overindulgence. Hundreds of songs are
downloaded. Many are actually listened to only once or twice, some
perhaps not at all. Eventually the downloader finds better uses for
those computer memory bytes. I suspect Napster users probably
wouldn't have purchased most of the songs they freely downloaded
out of curiosity or even gluttony.
Large content owners ought to be required to demonstrate actual
harm. One can't win a products liability case by suggesting a product
"might be" dangerous. It is a gross distortion of copyright law and
fundamental legal principles in general to say "there might be less creativity" because a technology "might be costing content owners
money." Yet Professor Lawrence Lessig has trenchantly observed that
while courts have held Congress to an extremely high standard when
regulating pornography, in part out of fear of generating harmful, unintended consequences for the Internet, the same courts will happily
enjoin alleged violations of the copyright law without any trial at all,
and in complete disregard of the effects on the Internet or technological development generally. 70 For example, in the Universal Music
Group litigation against MP3.com, Universal was awarded $100 million, which the judge noted "was lower than it might otherwise have
been because the company had made no effort to show that it had lost
sales as a result of My.MP3.com. '71
Additionally, large content owners need to prove that any losses
they incur are the result of copyright infringements, as opposed to
dreadful business practices. Consider the recent summer Olympics, in
which the International Olympic Committee appeared to assert ownership of the thoughts and feelings of Olympic athletes, as well as their
performances, claiming copyrights in interviews as well as in broad70 Lawrence Lessig, Copyrights Rule, THE STANDARD (Sept 29, 2000) at http://
www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,18964,00.html?nl-int (last visited Oct 2, 2000).
71 Amy Harmon, Enlisting Congress on Technology, N. Y. TIMES (October 2, 2000)
(Technology Section) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/02/technology/

02NECO.html (last visited Oct 3, 2000).
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casts, sound clips, and ticker-tape sports results. 72 NBC's website was

the only Internet site authorized to show video footage of Olympic
events, and NBC intentionally withheld footage for at least a day after
each event to drive viewers to its low-rated (numerically as well as
critically) television coverage. 73 Using copyright law to impede dissemination of everything related to the Olympics, 74 the International

Olympic Committee devoted a lot of resources to policing cyberspace
for infringing websites, 75 but in the view of most observers the biggest

76
threat by far to NBC's ratings was its poor coverage of the event.
The I.O.C. tried to use the power of the copyright monopoly to shield
NBC from the consequences of its own poor performance, and maybe
NBC would have garnered even fewer viewers if Olympic information
was coterminously available online. If the tactic was a success, it was
hardly a positive result for society.

D. Let Them Sell Cake
Most Americans are probably not the scofflaws that content own-

ers make us out to be. 77 In cyberspace as in real space, most U.S.
citizens (or "netizens") are law abiding most of the time. 78 As long as
72 See, e.g., Violators Caught as Olympic Video Monitored on Internet, CNN.com (Sept
22, 2000) at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/09/22/olympics.netpolice.ap/
index.html.
73 See id.
74 Dave Powell, President of Copyright Control Services, which monitored the Internet
on the I.O.C.'s behalf acknowledged that the I.O.C. put profits before access, stating
"Sports fans realize this material is out there and they'd like to be able to see it, but the
Olympics is funded by broadcasters around the world, buying exclusive broadcast rights
and paying a lot of money for those rights." Quoted in Violators Caught as Olympic Video
Monitored on Internet, CNN.com (Sept 22, 2000) at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/09/22/olympics.netpolice.ap/index.html.
75 See, e.g., Violators Caught as Olympic Video Monitored on Internet, CNN.com (Sept
22, 2000) at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/09/22/olympics.netpolice.ap/
index.html.
76 See, e.g., P. J. Bednarski, The Center Didn't Hold, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Oct. 2,
2000), available at http://www.tvinsite.com/broadcastingcable/index.asp?layout=webzine
(criticizing NBC's Olympic coverage).
77 See, e.g., Janelle Brown, Ethical Music Piracy, SALON (Oct. 5, 2000) at http://
www.salon.com/tech/log/2000/10/05/fairtunes/print.html, see also Janelle Brown, The Jukebox Manifesto, SALON (Nov. 13, 2000) at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/11/13/
jukebox/print.html (quoting Rob Reid, CEO of Listen.com for the proposition that "If
people can pirate for free, but it's hard to find things and it's hard to get good quality, most
people who have more money and less time than they used to have will feel fine paying $10
[for an industry-approved service] and getting a better experience." But see Jack Valenti,
Valenti Urged Congress to Support Copyright Protection in the InternetAge (June 15, 2000),
available at http://www.mpaa.org/jack/2000/00_06_15.htm (the Internet is infested with
thievery).
78 My focus is on U.S. residents since these are the folks that U.S. courts can realistically exercise jurisdiction over. I certainly don't mean to suggest other nations have either
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it is reasonably convenient, efficient, and economical to gain access to
a movie by renting a videocassette or DVD, ordering it through "payper-view," or watching it on cable television (all of which garner royalties for content owners), then few people are likely to invest a lot of
time and energy in obtaining counterfeit copies of the movie or gaining unauthorized access to any copies. If, as some observers suspect,
the ultimate goal of content providers is to eliminate circumvention
not only so they can capture escaping access fees, but so they can also
ratchet up access fees, at a minimum they should not be allowed to
pursue that goal without demonstrating entitlement to relief by establishing quantifiable losses. If content owners think we should be perfectly law abiding with respect to copyrights, then they should bear
the burden of developing and deploying technology to achieve this
goal. Courts should not do for content owners what they do not at
least attempt for themselves.
If (for example) Napster evolves into a service for which users
pay a flat monthly fee for access to a fixed library of songs administered by Napster, one could expect the same songs that were selling
well in real space to compose the bulk of the downloads (the hits will
get the hits!) and therefore claim for their owners the majority share
of the revenue stream. Under a flat royalty (e.g., monthly fee) scenario, new songs from lesser-known or unknown artists could be accessed without additional cost, unlike in real space, where acquiring a
permanently storable, playable version of a song requires either a special purchase or, minimally, the time and effort necessary to borrow
the song in a tangible medium and make an unauthorized copy. However, new songs from new or lesser-known artists can't be downloaded
if there is no "legal" technology to accomplish this, or if the same
recording companies that aren't making CDs of this music now (perhaps because they don't want their "stars" to face competition) are in
control of the technology.
If a technology is truly depriving artists of significant amounts of
wealth, that is indeed problematic. However, if the technology's primary effect is to redistribute wealth from traditional music companies
to entities utilizing alternative modes of distribution, without affecting
greater or lesser concentrations of cyber pirates within their borders. But see Jack Valenti,
President of the MPAA: If You Can't Protect What You Own-You Don't Own Anything;
Comments by Jack Valenti President & Chief Executive Officer Motion Picture Association of America before the House Subcommittee on Courts & Intellectual Property on
WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and the Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act, available at http://www.mpaa.org/jack/97/979_16b.htm ("In China, in Russia, in
Italy, in scores of other countries, video pirates steal more than $2 billion of our intellecRussia ... is literally infested with pirates ... ").
tual property each year ....
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most artists and authors (or perhaps helping them in the process),
then the technology has not compromised the goals of copyright law.
No one truly knows which approach to copyright best encourages creativity and supports content creation. The current approach certainly
supports large revenues. By one report, record companies made $15
billion last year 79 (record profits, if the reader will excuse the pun) in
spite of Napster, Scour, and every other copying and sharing technology they have not yet taken down or taken over. Similarly, U.S. box
office receipts were $7.5 billion in 1999,80 in addition to revenues generated through foreign distribution, licensing arrangements, transmission fees from cable television channels, video rental royalties, and so
forth. Yet these industries suggest that piracy renders these returns
inadequate. If this is true, perhaps it is because content owners failed
to adapt to new technology, not because of some inadequacy of copyright law. If large companies cannot profitably distribute creative content, let them sell content that is not creative.
CONCLUSION

I conclude with a story to illustrate just one of the myriad reasons
it would be detrimental to allow content owners to arrest technology.
When I was in practice, I had occasion to appear in municipal courts,
usually in pro bono matters. During the course of one appearance, a
judge ruled against my client in a way that contravened binding precedent from the state appellate court. Neither the judge, nor opposing
counsel, nor I was aware of this very recent court decision at the time
of the ruling, but I discovered it immediately upon returning to the
office, and promptly filed a motion for reconsideration of the verdict.
However, the judge refused to hear the motion until he had a transcript of the trial, which would have required my client to pay a $5,000
deposit toward the court reporter's transcription fees. My client didn't
have $5,000, and that fact effectively ended the matter.8 ' I firmly be79 See Jon Katz, Metallica's 'Justice' And Napster, SLASHDOT (April 28, 2000), at http://
slashdot.org/features/00/04/16/2139241.shtml (last visited Oct 12, 2000), citing Variety. See
also Federal Trade Commission's press release, Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of
Restraining Competition in CD Music Market-All Five Major DistributorsAgree to Abandon Advertising Pricing Policies (May 10, 2000), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/cdpres.htm (record business $15 billion dollar a year industry).
80 Jack Valenti Press Release, All-Time Box Office, Continued Reduction in Production
Costs, Internet Access of Ratings Explanations Highlighted in Valenti Showest Address,
available at http://www.mpaa.org/jack/2000/00_03_07.htm (last visited Oct 16, 2000).
81 An experienced attorney later suggested that my motion had embarrassed the judge,
and that I should have figured out a way to tip the judge off about the case informally so
that he could have appeared to discover it on his own, and withdrawn and reissued the
order in a more face-saving manner.
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lieve that my client would have had a better chance at a just outcome
if courts had access to inexpensive, effective recording and transcription technology, and I know many attorneys who long for faster, more
accurate trial transcripts. For a variety of reasons, neither state court
systems nor even federal courts are likely to fund the prompt development of voice recognition and transcription technologies from scratch.
However, they certainly may adopt appropriate technologies developed for other, more lucrative applications. With all due respect to
court reporters, this can't happen quickly enough for me, and I am
loath to see the development of any potentially useful technology arrested by copyright owners.
A better solution is to place the burden on copyright owners to
develop or license technologies of their own to inhibit unauthorized
copying. The copyright industry should attempt to develop digital content that is problematic as a technical (rather than legal) matter to
copy. Failing this, content owners ought to make business decisions
based on the reality that some sharing and copying will occur. If this
renders certain creative-arts ventures unprofitable, so be it. Industry
principals can invest their money in real estate development or sock
factories-potentially profitable ventures that do not generally expose
capital to the risks of copyright infringement. Perhaps this raises the
dreaded specter of a world without Metallica, but most artists will
probably go on creating. If the production of art and information does
decline, we can always return to current practices, or perhaps invent
new approaches to copyright altogether.

